Firms with a reputation as socially responsible may have an important cost advantage: If workers prefer their employer to be socially responsible, equilibrium wages may be lower in such firms. We explore this hypothesis, combining Norwegian register data with data on firm reputation collected by an employer branding firm. Adjusting for a large set of background variables, we find that the firm's social responsibility reputation is significantly associated with lower wages.
Introduction
Voluntary approaches to environmental protection have gained increasing attention in the environmental economics literature. One such approach is corporate social responsibility (CSR): the phenomenon that private firms voluntarily make costly efforts to achieve social goals, or to avoid socially damaging consequences of their production activities, over and above what is required by government regulation. The social goals involved may be associated with environmental protection (such as pollution abatement or waste reduction measures), with workers' rights (safety, abstaining from child labor), or other social goals such as poverty reduction. 4 Although the environmental impacts may be hard to assess, corporate social responsibility as a phenomenon appears to be widespread (Portney 2008) . This can hardly be explained by the simplest economic textbook models: in a competitive market populated by homo oeconomicus agents, firms paying higher costs than necessary will typically be wiped out by more efficient competitorsregardless of whether the excessive costs were caused by wastefulness or by ethical motives.
Recently, however, economists have offered several possible explanations of CSR (see Lyon and Maxwell 2008 for an excellent review). The most common explanation seems to be that customers may have ethical concerns, making them willing to pay more for the firm's products if the production process is viewed as ethically superior (e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995, Besley and Ghatak, 2007) . Similarly, shareholders may be willing to accept lower returns on capital to ensure that the production is ethically defensible (Cullis et al., 1992 , Baron 2007 , 2009 ). In the present paper, however, we will focus on the idea that employees may care about the social responsibility of their employer (Frank 2004 , Besley and Ghatak 2005 , Heal 2005 , Brekke and Nyborg 2008 .
If a sufficiently large number of employees prefer their employer to be socially responsible, then this would, presumably, affect equilibrium wages. A worker with such a preference would, all else given, strictly prefer a socially responsible to a socially irresponsible employer. With continuous preferences, this would imply that there exists some strictly positive wage differential such that even if the socially responsible firm offers a lower wage by this amount, the worker would still prefer the responsible employment alternative. Thus, this simple argument implies that we should expect that the going market wage is lower in firms believed to be more socially responsible .
To our knowledge, however, few empirical studies have looked at this. 5 One exception is Frank (2004) , who used an employment survey among recent Cornell graduates in which respondents reported their current salary, type of job, and the name of their employer, and where he was able to combine this with university data on respondents' completed courses and exam grades. Frank then asked another sample (Cornell students) to rate firms and types of jobs according to their social responsibility. Controlling for sex, curriculum and academic performance, he found a large and statistically significant compensating salary differential, with professions and firms rated as less socially responsible earning substantially higher salaries. Interestingly, Frank (2004) also found that although the wage differential was of a similar magnitude for men and women, women were much more likely to be employed in socially responsible firms; which lead him to speculate that women's higher concern for socially responsible work might be one factor contributing to the prevalent wage differences between genders.
Our aim with the present study is to explore whether similar effects can be identified among Norwegian firms; more precisely, whether there is a negative association between a firm's reputation as socially responsible and the wage level of this firm's employees. Note that firm reputation might not correspond to firm behavior. 6 If the two differ, both could potentially affect wages: reputation may influence external social approval or sanctions faced by employees, as well as 5 However, several authors have studied the relationship between wages and firms' profit versus non-profit status, with mixed results. See, e.g., Leete (2001) , Mocan and Tekin (2003) , Frank (2004) .
6 See Lyon and Maxwell (2011) . the firm's ability to recruit new employees; actual firm behavior may be of concern to current employees with inside information. In the current paper, we focus exclusively on the effects on firm reputation.
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Our data on wages, as well as several background variables such as education, gender, family status, geographical location and industry, originates from register data. Our data on firm reputation comes from surveys conducted by the international, Swedish-based employer branding firm Universum.
This strategy yields a data set with observations for more than 100,000 full-time employees.
The analysis suggests that after controlling for a large number of background variables, there is a substantial and statistically significant negative effect of CSR reputation on wages. This effect, however, is mainly present for men, a fact which is at least partly due to a correlation between CSR reputation and firms' gender equality policies.
Thus, a reputation as socially responsible may provide firms with a cost advantage, possibly allowing such firms to survive even with fierce market competition -and even in the absence of ethical consumers and/or ethical investors.
Data on firm reputation
Universum 8 is an international employer branding firm, specializing in providing advice to firms on how to attract the firm's preferred potential employees. As a part of this work, Universum conducts several surveys each year in a number of countries. In Norway, Universum conducts two annual surveys: the Young Professionals Survey, conducted among recently graduated young professionals, 7 There is a literature on the link between firms' actual social behavior, e.g. green production, and their economic performance (for example, Telle 2006) , but these studies typically do not focus on wage levels. Cole et al. (2009) , using UK data, found a small wage premium for working in a polluting industry; these results could, however (as the authors do), be explained by workers' increased health risks when exposed to pollution. For studies on the relationship between CSR and financial performance see, e.g., Waddock and Graves (1997) , McWilliams and Siegel (2000) . Universum does not directly elicit data on firms' CSR records. Instead, respondents are asked to report up to five "ideal" employers from a list; that is, those firms on this list that the respondent would most prefer to work for. 9 The respondents are then asked whether they associate a number of characteristics with each of these up to 5 firms. 10 "Corporate social responsibility" is one of those characteristics.
Thus, for each respondent we have at most one yes/no answer to the question of whether the respondent associates this firm with CSR. 11 The procedure implies a selection issue in our CSR data:
Every observation comes from a respondent who has chosen this particular firm as one of his/her favorite potential employers. Moreover, we have no CSR reputation data at all from those firms who 9 If the respondent has reported to be familiar with less than six companies on the provided list: "Now choose the company/companies you would like to work for more than any other". Otherwise: "Now choose 5 companies you would like to work for more than any other".
are Consequently, in our analysis we only include firms that have in fact been chosen as an ideal employer. This means, of course, that our sample consists of systematically more attractive employers than those firms that are not included. Since our hypothesis is precisely that CSR is one feature improving the attractiveness of an employer, one must consider potential endogeneity problems arising from this: If an employer were attractive only because of its CSR reputation, we might not find any effect of CSR reputation at all in our data, since we would have eliminated all relevant variation in the CSR variable in the very data selection process. Since there may be a multitude of reasons for an employer's popularity, we still believe that our data can be used in a potentially interesting way. The crucial question for whether our results may be expected to hold even for less popular firms is whether the relationship between wage and CSR reputation is different for popular than for unpopular firms. We see no obvious a priori reason why this would be the case; however, the reader should bear in mind that our sample is selected in a special way.
The central CSR reputation indicator used in our analysis is the relative CSR score, defined as the number of respondents who have reported to associate this firm with CSR divided by the number of respondents choosing this firm as an ideal employer. That is, we use as our reputation measure the share associating the firm with CSR among those who actually did choose that firm. 12 We will not
provide a more precise interpretation of the term CSR here; our CSR reputation indicator is simply 12 An alternative would be to use an absolute CSR count; however, if CSR is not the most important characteristics for choosing ideal employers, this would imply that if two firms A and B have the same CSR reputation, but A is more popular due to e.g. high salaries or prestige, A would receive a higher score.
based on respondents' subjective perception of the concept, which we have no further information about. Unfortunately, we are not able to merge the Universum data with the register data on an individual level.
As indicated above, the data generating process for the relative CSR score implies that we will systematically have more CSR reputation observations from popular employers. Since the relative CSR score is an aggregate indicator, and the number of observations used to calculate each firm's relative CSR score depends on the firm's popularity, our CSR reputation indicator will be more imprecise (based on less information) for less popular firms. To avoid extreme observations generated by this procedure, we have excluded companies chosen as ideal employers by less than four survey respondents.
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In Universum's survey data, respondents report their views on several company characteristics in addition to CSR. We chose to use a subset of these, excluding characteristics we believe to be directly related to wage determination (the latter to avoid endogeneity problems). 
The register data
We have merged the relative CSR scores derived from the Universum survey with the official Norwegian linked employer-employee register with cash wages for 2007. 14 For each registered employment record of all individuals in Norway, we have reliable data on taxable annual labor 13 A robustness check revealed that increasing this number to e.g. eight did not cause substantial changes in our estimates.
14 The employment register provides the employer's identification number, which we use to link with our CSR reputation data.
income, employment duration and industry classification. One problem with this data is that hourly wages are not recorded, only total annual income and whether or not employment is full-or parttime. In the present study, we include only recorded full-time employment, and only records with yearly cash wage above 200,000 NOK.
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The employer-employee register, now linked with CSR reputation data, is then further merged with demographic register data, which provides information about each employee's date of birth, gender, marital status, region of living, educational attainment, immigrant status and citizenship. We restrict our sample to the age span 25 to 67.
We also have at our disposal another register data set of yearly wage statistics for employees of a large selection of private companies in Norway. This register data provides information on occupation type for each employee as per 1 st October 2007. 16 Although this data set covers only private companies, we have used this information on occupation types together with the merged employer-employee register to perform further robustness checks on the effect of CSR reputation on wages. Appendix tables A1-A2 provide concise statistics of our analyzing samples.
Empirical modeling
The general modeling framework is very simple and straightforward, and is based on an OLS regression of log wage on regressors. In NOYP, respondents report current hourly wages and also whether they associate their current employer with CSR. This data cannot be merged with the individual level register data, but one could perform a regression of log hourly wage on a dummy indicator of CSR using only the NOYP survey data (neither NOGS nor register data). Preliminary analysis using this approach did not reveal any clear relationships between wage and CSR. This approach reduces the size and scope of the dataset considerably, however: NOYP 2006 and NOYP 2007 regressions are based on self-reported wage data for 3362 and 3060 individuals, respectively, all of whom are highly educated within economics, business, engineering/natural science, IT or law. Our preferred approach comprises about 109,000 officially registered wage observations, including all types of employees in firms for which we have CSR reputation data.
Since the employment register data only contains yearly wage 21 and not hours worked during the year, we perform the OLS of log yearly wage on regressors. We have to our disposal the four sets of relative CSRs derived from four surveys. Since we have few CSR observations for some firms (see the discussion of the survey data above), and since there might be time lags between changes in firm reputation and wages, we choose to combine all four sets of relative CSR scores to form a combined firm reputation indicator from these four surveys. This combined relative CSR score data is then merged with 2007 employer-employee register data to perform wage regression. The crude samples from NOYP and NOGS contain about 100-150 companies each. 22 The range of our relative CSR score is from 0 to 0.69 in the estimation sample
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We first estimate a simple model with only demographic information, such as age, gender, family status, education attainment etc, and relative CSR score. We then gradually introduce other control variables, such as industry, , an interactive term of gender and relative CSR score, and other company characteristics. While Tables 1 and 2 report only coefficient on variables of main interest, more detailed results are provided in Appendix tables A4 and A5.We have performed regressions on all individuals, as well as separately on higher educated persons (with at least 13 years of education attainment).
We have deliberately chosen a simple econometric approach, making no explicit modeling attempts to handle, for example, possible selection problems in the CSR/wage framework. Our analysis is based on the hypothesis that there is indeed self-selection of workers (for example more idealistic 21 The yearly wage statistics register we derive occupational information from, does contain contracted working hours per week and contracted cash wage per month, which in theory could be used to calculate hourly wage. The quality of this particular information seems rather poor, however, hence not providing an adequate basis for reasonably consistent measurement of hourly wage.
ones) into CSR firms. Adjusting for such self-selection would hence mask the very effect we are looking for. Nevertheless, there might be other self-selection effects biasing our results, for example if idealistic workers were also less competent. Our approach here is to use our very rich official register data to correct for observed differences in e.g. education, industry and age, and study whether there is still a significant wage loss in firms with a good CSR reputation. Like in any simple regression analysis, we cannot, of course, claim causal relationships. Table 1 presents our main results. The bold faced numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Results
We conduct regressions of log yearly wage on relative CSR score and other variables.
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Model I is the basic model, with no controls for industries and corporate characteristics. An immediate observation is that compared to male workers, females have about 14% lower annual wage incomes. The estimate on relative CSR is -0.38 and statistically significant. That is, for otherwise similar firms and employees, a firm with relative CSR score of 1 (everyone choosing this firm as an ideal employer associates it with CSR) would be expected to pay 38 percent lower wages than a firm with relative CSR score of 0 (no-one choosing this firm associates it with CSR). Frank (2004) found that women were substantially more likely than men to occupy jobs considered as socially responsible. If men and women relate differently to CSR, their wage differentials might also differ. Model II introduces an interactive term between female and corporate social responsibility. The estimated wage loss associated with CSR now increases to 42%, the coefficient still being statistically significant. The gender wage gap increases to about 19%. The interactive term of female with CSR is only weakly significant; note, however, that its coefficient is almost of the same magnitude as the gender gap.
In model III we add controls for industrial wage differentials, which reduce the coefficient for CSR to -0.24. This is to be expected, since some industries (e.g. health and care giving) presumably have a better reputation in terms of social responsibility than others (e.g. petroleum and mining). 25 The interaction term between female and CSR is now significant and substantial (a coefficient of 0.22), of the same magnitude as the gender effect (-0.21), and almost cancels out the entire CSR effect for females.
In model IV, we introduce the other corporate characteristics. The coefficient for CSR is now further reduced to -0.21, indicating correlation between CSR and other attractive firm characteristics. The interaction term for female and CSR has a coefficient of 0.21, which means that for women, no wage loss is associated with CSR. Part of the explanation can perhaps be found looking at the coefficient for "Equality between the sexes", which is highly and significantly negative. It may simply be the case that CSR firms have less of a gender gap in wages than other firms. In fact, it turns out that the correlation coefficient between the CSR and gender equality indicators is as high as 0.36.
We have thus also included an interaction term between female and Equality between the sexes in model V. This term is substantial and significant, meaning that while all employees experience a wage loss by working in firms with gender equality, this loss is considerably smaller for females. Its inclusion decreases the CSR coefficient to -0.18, but also decreases the magnitude of the interaction term for female*CSR. Model V indicates that while men experience a wage loss of 18% by working in a firm with CSR score of 1 rather than 0, women's corresponding wage loss is only about 6%.
Model VI estimates on the higher educated workers with educational attainment above high school (college and university degrees). Here, the variable "good reputation at my school" becomes significant; the wage loss from gender equality seems to be the same for men and women, while 25 Note, however, that we use rather broad industry categories here; see the Appendix.
men again experience a substantially larger wage loss from CSR than women. The coefficient for CSR, however, is still negative, statistically significant, and quite substantial (-0.20) .
Other coefficients are also rather robust across all model specifications (in Appendix Table A4 ).
Taking the full model V, married males have a wage premium of about 6%; married women, however, have a wage loss of about 4.5%. Wage premia (relative to educational level at high school) increase with higher educational attainment above university level. Interestingly, immigrants as a whole do not experience a wage loss comparing to ethnic Norwegians, but immigrants from non-OECD countries suffer a wage loss as large as 23% in general. As mentioned above, we have access to another register data set providing information of each individual's type of occupation, although only for the private sector firms. To explore whether the above results on CSR related wage differentials could be due to job types, we also run estimations for private companies only, controlling for occupation categories. Results are provided in Table 2 .
In model I, there are no controls for industries and occupations. The estimate for CSR is here on par with that of model II in Table 1 , but with a significant, positive interactive term for women*CSR.
Alternately controlling for industries and occupations changes neither the signs nor significance of CSR and women*CSR (models II and III). Controlling for both industries and occupations, as well as company characteristics, has no substantial impact on the estimated coefficients for CSR and women*CSR (models IV, V, and VI). Our finding of a significant, negative coefficient for relative CSR thus seems robust across model specifications. However, this effect is mostly observed for men, even when we control for reported gender equality at the firm level and occupation types. On the basis of our data, this gender difference is hard to explain further; hence we are left to speculation.
One possibility is that since CSR and gender equality are highly correlated, their effects may be confounded in the analysis. Another explanation, however, is that women have different jobs than men: they are for example much more likely to have jobs concerned with nursing, caretaking and teaching. These jobs would perhaps be judged by many as socially responsible, but neither our CSR indicator, the education variables, nor the available occupational categories are fine-tuned enough to capture all such differences in job types.
Hence, it may actually be the case that there is a wage loss associated with CSR for females as well, but this is captured by the gender gap. In this respect, it is interesting to note that in most of our model specifications, the gender gap and the interaction variable female*CSR, measuring the difference between CSR's effect on men's and women's wages, are of opposite signs and roughly similar magnitudes. This interpretation would be roughly in line with Frank (2004) , who estimated a CSR wage differential of a similar magnitude for men and women, but also found that women were much more likely to have 'responsible' employment than men.
Conclusions
If workers prefer socially responsible employment, all else given, then irresponsible employers must pay more to recruit equally qualified employees. Combining survey data on firm reputation with official register data on demographic and labor market variables, comprising wage observations for more than 100,000 full-time employees, we do find a negative, substantial, and statistically significant association between wage and CSR reputation among Norwegian firms.
However, this effect is mainly observed for men. This is partly, but not fully, explained by a high correlation between firms' CSR reputation and gender equality policies. One possible explanation is that due to strong gender differences in job types, not fully accounted for in our analysis, part of the social responsibility wage loss for women may be captured by the gender gap coefficient.
We conclude that firms associated with CSR do indeed have a cost advantage in terms of lower wage payments as compared to other firms. One implication is that even if social responsibility is associated with higher costs, for example in terms of higher emission abatement expenses, responsible firms may survive market competition -even in the absence of ethical consumers or investors. Since labor costs constitute a major cost component for most firms, this might well be of substantial importance when it comes to firm profitability. 
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